Introduction
Most commentators have so far limited to criticizing Trump’s criticism of the European Union contained in the November 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). In truth, this Trump II manifesto is not a message against Europe itself, recognized as the source of common civilization, but against the current direction of European policy, which the American president aims to “correct.” A Europe that is so weak, deindustrialized, and insecure — as emerges from the text of the NSS — a Europe without roots and without “self-confidence” represents a problem not only for the European peoples but also, in perspective, for the United States. Without an army, without an industrial system, with a restricted and uncompetitive financial market, prey to woke “anti-values” but also incapable of acting promptly, of defining common strategic objectives, and increasingly dependent on foreign supplies, often from the East, a trend that has grown dangerously since 2022, the EU risks becoming the “soft underbelly” of NATO.
The United States is unequivocally addressing the issue of how to maintain its global leadership, which was at risk of being compromised “after four years of weakness and extremism.” In the NSS, Trump focuses on two factors: the military factor, which is the recipient of a substantial allocation of funds, whose cornerstones are nuclear deterrence and technological evolution (including in the space sector), and the economy factor, of industry, protected by tariffs, because it must be able to “meet production demands in both peacetime and wartime,” and of finance, now capable of influencing, if not controlling, the economies of any country and, as such, called upon to support the US government’s action “to Make America Great Again.”
At the same time, this document identifies certain scenarios of primary interest to the United States: first and foremost, the reestablishment of a sphere of exclusive interest extending from Canada to Argentina (the “Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”), i.e., the formation of a highly integrated, American-led political-economic bloc and, in the event of a global crisis, potentially autonomous; the continuation, in the spirit of Anchorage, of the attempt to attract Russia in order to prevent the consolidation of the Heartland, which has always been the nightmare of all Anglo-Saxon strategists (from Mackinder to Spykman, including US Admiral Alfred T. Mahan and Homer Lea); finally, the relaunch of Europe, including through its reconfiguration, which must necessarily take into account its particular historical development.
In doing so, the NSS recognizes the evolution towards a world that is, if not multipolar, at least tripolar, composed of three vertices: the American, the Chinese, and the Russian. Europe is always and in any case seen as an appendage of the US. Given the crisis of international organizations, or rather of those intermediate bodies of a predominantly bureaucratic nature, as a good realpolitik politician, Trump seeks to build new foundations for peaceful dialogue between the blocs directly with the institutional representatives of the individual states that compose them, preventing large-scale degeneration of conflicts.
“America,” claims the 47th President, “is strong and respected again, and that is why we are making peace all over the world.”
In light of this, this analysis aims to provide an original, albeit deliberately not overly detailed, interpretation of Donald Trump’s NSS, seeking to identify the key points and qualitative leaps forward compared to similar documents produced by his predecessors.
What is NSS and why is it so important
The US National Security Strategy (NSS) is a summary of the objectives of each US presidency.
It is published every presidential term and serves as an ideal compass for the administration with a dual purpose: internal strategic-political, to enable the Executive to define, in a unified and consistent manner, the long-term strategic vision for national security and coordinate the various components (defense, diplomacy, economy, intelligence, etc.), and external communication, towards the public, allies, or third-party governments, as well as towards the domestic public interested in understanding the priorities of foreign and security policy priorities. Although it lacks concrete effectiveness, as it is not conceived as a technical-operational document, but as a general framework of intent with a deliberately abstract content, unlike the National Military Strategy (NMS) or the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the NSS deserves – especially today – in-depth analysis.
We are faced with a proactive presidency that does not merely follow the course of events but intends to influence them so that the United States does not lose its global primacy and remains the “safest, richest, and freest” nation in the world. This manifesto document is particularly relevant in light of the current moment of transition: on the one hand, the White House observes the Old World in the throes of a structural, institutional, industrial, cultural, and moral crisis and destroyed by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and on the other, the New World—the Asian power approaching its zenith—which is a competitor. The stance to be taken is defined, the actions to be taken are linked together, American values and the American Way of Life are relaunched.
It is the summa of a vision that is certainly Trumpian but shared by the deep state, an establishment that is not only Republican but also Democratic, because strong countries think in terms of national interest, which now seems to be aligned with Trump’s shock therapy. America must become strong again, it must return to health, its impoverished middle class must regain confidence, its allies must stop relying on it solely, but they must also respect it.
To do this, as in a business strategy, it is necessary to identify permanent national interests, scenarios in which to highlight them, potential threats, and allies. From the “wish lists” that have populated the documents of the US elites since the end of the Cold War, we are moving towards a clarification of priorities. America cannot be omnipresent, nor can it intervene everywhere: there are priority scenarios and secondary ones; in some cases considered serious and harmful, it may be forced to intervene directly (Trump mentions the cancellation of Iran’s nuclear program, certainly an action that demonstrated to the world not only the US’s operational military capability, but also its technological supremacy and diplomatic skill), in others, strengthened by its role as a global military and technological pivot, it must “limit itself” to playing the role of mediator, resorting, however, as we read, to “unconventional diplomacy”, “military power” and “American economic leverage.”
A turning point in relations with Europe
America looks on with concern at Europe, which has been hit by economic decline and the simultaneous decline of its civilization. Societies, as we know, collapse for internal reasons, and the collapse of the Old Continent, duly documented and denounced not only by Trump and Musk, but also by historians, political scientists, economists, and international institutions far removed from what is now called “Trumpism,” is seen as a risk factor even on the other side of the Atlantic.
For the first time in over a decade, Europe—which was barely mentioned in Obama and Biden’s presidential NSS, focused on the Pacific horizon—has a significant weight in the strategic agenda of the United States, which aims to revive “European greatness” so that no other power can rise to dominate Europe. Europe’s role as a driving force of civilization is recognized, notably its closeness to Ireland and Great Britain, due to the Special Relationship. At the same time, it is difficult to understand the current European State-non-State, where regulatory hypertrophy is linked to fragility and fragmentation.
Neither Obama nor Biden-Harris had reserved a similar space for the Old Continent, except to insist on increasing defense spending, as required by the treaties (5% of GDP, which Trump was the first to impose). Obama had completely shifted the strategic center of gravity to Asia, in line with Biden’s strong emphasis on an “open and secure” Pacific; even the first Trump administration had reserved only a residual space for the European dossier.
The European Union, which never misses an opportunity to attack the US president and his administration, has lost sight of Western values and, according to Trump, risks becoming “unrecognizable in 20 years or less.”
“We want Europe – he writes – to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence, and to abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation.”
Last but not least, Trump intends to promote reconciliation between Russia and Europe (attempted, on Italy’s initiative, since the Pratica di Mare summit, but short-sightedly opposed by other actors fearful of losing their dominant influence over the European Union), since the war has caused the Old Continent to lose competitive advantages and increased its dependence on imports.
“Managing European relations with Russia will require – we read in the document – significant U.S. diplomatic engagement, both to reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass, and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.”
At the same time, the NSS records the sentiment of Europeans and the discrepancy, if not outright disconnect, between their desires and the actions of Brussels: “A large European majority wants peace, yet that desire is not translated into policy, in large measure because of those governments’ subversion of democratic processes. This is strategically important to the United States precisely because European states cannot reform themselves if they are trapped in political crisis.” There is a problem with democracy in Europe, not in terms of the risk of reproducing absolutist models, but in terms of the evident lack of representativeness of European Institutions, which are increasingly self-referential, and this is also damaging American interests which, as stated in the NSS, need an authoritative and effective interlocutor.
In closing, it is worth noting that the NSS mentions Germany, the geographical and productive heart of the continent, and, among NATO countries, Turkey, limited to the complicated Syrian dossier.
Russia’s key role
Russia is once again becoming a partner for the United States, which at the same time is showing increasing impatience with the current Ukrainian leadership. It is worth noting the particular closeness between Trump and Moscow and the tycoon’s affinity with Putin, who boasts high-level connections with the Soviet and post-Soviet nomenclature. In the 1980s, it was Trump who accompanied Gorbachev to New York, during which time he came into contact with high society and the financial world.
Furthermore, at various points in history, Russia and the United States have found common ground. Early on, Catherine II gave indirect support to colonial rebels; her son Alexander I established formal relations with the United States under Thomas Jefferson, and before that, Levett Harris (1780–1839) had been sent as consul to St. Petersburg.
In the 1930s, the powerful Soviet industrialization was supported by copious American supplies: agricultural machinery, fertilizers, industrial machinery, capital, but also technical expertise in large quantities. Thanks to Stalin’s five-year plan, kombinats – large integrated industrial complexes – were built in Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk for steel production, Karaganda and Kuzbass for coal, not to mention tractor factories in Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk and car factories in Moscow and Gorky. Russian factories worked at a level equal to that of American factories, achieving almost the same standardization.
“I spent a week in Sverdlovsk”, writes John Scott eloquently in his 1942 book Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia’s City of Steel. “Some engineers took me to visit the Ural Heavy Machine Building Works. A 400-meter-long building was filled with the best American, British, and German machinery. It was better equipped than any single workshop at General Electric Works in Schenectady.”
Furthermore: the extraordinary Dneprostroi dam on the Dnipro River was designed by American engineer and colonel Hugh Lincoln Cooper, while the Lugansk locomotive factory — one of the largest in Europe at the time — was inspired by Baldwin Locomotive Works. At the same time, the thawing of relations, which culminated in 1933, was indispensable to the final victory in World War II. Enlightening and even predictive of the interpenetration of capitalism and communist systems, the book Vodka Cola (1977), in which trade unionist Charles Levinson highlights the dense web of business ties between the two “opposing” blocs.
In Trump’s strategy, Russia is the key piece in completing a sort of ellipse capable of containing Beijing (or directing its dynamism so that it does not conflict or immediately clash with American interests), preventing the formation of an autonomous and integrated bloc centered on the Chinese dragon and supported by the Indian tiger and the Russian bear. This strategy is set to be completed with a renewed focus on the Indian subcontinent: India, as in the days of the “Great Game,” has once again become the springboard for Anglo-Saxon powers toward Asia and plays a central role in the defensive system against Beijing, while Pakistan, which was close to the Anglo-Americans during the Cold War, has become an indispensable ally of China. In essence, Trump aims to encourage Russia’s revisionism with the ambitious goal of co-opting it into an anti-Chinese coalition.
The President also stresses the need to restore relations between Russia and Europe itself, in a perspective to prevent a larger-scale war according to the principle of “peace through strength” (not “force” as emphasized by Washington), in line with the message conveyed by Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Conference.
The Middle East: in the wake of the Abraham Accords
The Middle East is the subject of a specific analysis that includes the central role of the Abraham Accords in current and future US strategy, and, also through the words of Rabbi Elie Abadie, the NSS rules out the idea of a new season of wars.
The balance of power in the region is to be managed “from behind” by Washington. But all this without other players (China, Iran, or Russia) being cable to play a hegemonic or even just a predominant role in the region.
Trump’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
This is precisely how it is described: Trump’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in a perspective of absolute centrality attributed to the “Western Hemisphere.” In line with Monroe’s thinking, which affirmed US primacy (December 2, 1823) just after the victory of the Restoration on the European continent (notably the victory of Trocadero and the conquest of Cadiz on the Atlantic in August 1823), which could bring Europeans back to the Americas, the Island-America returns to thinking and acting as Pan-America, extending from Canada to Argentina, an economic and commercial lung according to the principle that the destiny of the Western Hemisphere must remain under the direct control of the United States, without interference from extra-regional powers, because the space left in this region to non-hemispheric competitors has been “another great American strategic mistake of recent decades.”
Conclusions
This is a document steeped in meaning, formalized in light of global upheavals but also following the actions carried out in the first nine months of administration. It is a text that sets out in black and white the reasons for the crisis of the American model from an economic and moral point of view, but which aims to dictate a concrete and timely agenda to preserve the global primacy of the United States.
Because this is the overarching principle enshrined in the NSS. A principle that is also based on the conviction that technological supremacy (in the military sphere but also, and perhaps above all, in the civilian sphere), together with economic and financial supremacy, is the key to global primacy.
By consigning the historical cycle of “globalism” and “free trade” to the archives and reestablishing the principle of “full control of borders” Trump confirms himself as a revolutionary president because he draws a line under the policies of the last thirty years, which he claims are at the root of America’s decline. At the same time, however, he is also conservative, as he moves within the classic and established lines of Anglo-American geopolitics, from the exclusive Pan-American sphere protected from external interference and safe from illegal trafficking to the protection of maritime economic interests in the Atlantic and, above all, in the Pacific.
America once again considers itself an island benefiting from “An enviable geography with abundant natural resources, no competing powers physically dominant in our Hemisphere, borders at no risk of military invasion, and other great powers separated by vast oceans,” but it is reviving its network of global alliances and soft power, setting itself a comprehensive program of industrial growth and placing European civilization and its values, including Christianity, under its protection, particularly in light of a US-born Pope, Leone XIV.
Net of criticism, however justified, European countries should seize the opportunity to modernize their industrial and manufacturing systems with North American capital, know-how, technology, and intelligence in a mutually beneficial and collaborative perspective.
The authors
Luca Lanzalone: lawyer and founder of Studio Lanzalone Costantini & Partners, member of the board of companies in Italy and worldwide operating in the energy and infrastructure field; he has taught at university and is the author of various publications.
Lorenzo Somigli: journalist, head of external relations for Italian companies operating worldwide, particularly in the raw materials field.
